

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Council


26 August 1987

NOTE FOR: ADCI

FROM: C/NIC

Bob -- In addition to your NFIB book, Charlie Allen provided this late this afternoon as a basis for our discussion at the 0930 meeting with you tomorrow.

V/R,


Frank B. Horton III
Major General, USAF

Attachment:
As stated

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IIA: Iran's Use of Terrorism

(The Department of State has requested an interagency assessment on Iran's use of terrorism, with particular attention being given to Tehran's motivations, organizations involved, and capabilities to conduct terrorism abroad. State and the NSC see this paper as a baseline assessment for use by the US policy community [REDACTED])

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[REDACTED] Highlighted below are key findings of the IIA. We plan to have a final draft ready for approval on Friday.)

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-- The Khomeini regime views the use of terror as a legitimate means for advancing Iranian national interests and for exporting Iran's revolutionary ideals. It has found terrorism a cheap and effective way to advance these goals. Iran has never been made to pay a significant price for its use of terrorism as a political weapon, a factor that reinforces its willingness to use this tactic.

-- In recent years Iran's use of terrorism has become more skillful and selective. Tehran has used terrorism less to export the Islamic revolution and more to further specific foreign policy objectives.

-- There is general consensus among the leadership that terrorism is an acceptable policy option. Despite some difference among key leaders on the propriety and efficacy on particular acts of terrorism, none of them would be reluctant to use terrorism against the United States or its allies.

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